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homas Lubanga, leader of a militia group sup-
ported by Uganda, has been charged with
committing mass war crimes and crimes
against humanity in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC).1 During the civil war, Lubanga
conscripted child soldiers into his militia, using young
girls as sexual slaves.2 Carine Bapita, who represents
five of the victims in the case against Lubanga at the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC), described how “rape
began as soon as they were abducted,”
and “[s]ome were tortured.”3 In addi-
tion to crimes committed against chil-
dren, Lubanga allegedly ordered and
committed systematic rapes, sexual tor-
ture, and mass murder.4
International criminal law is the
primary mechanism to prosecute indi-
viduals and to hold such individuals ac-
countable for their most serious crimes,
including sexual violence.5 Prosecutors
at the ICC are charged with the respon-
sibility to investigate and charge perpe-
trators.6 Yet, international criminal law
has been slow to take up the fight
against sex-based crimes.7
Some progress has been made.  Examples of
progress include the creation of international human
rights laws targeting gendered crimes,8 the 1981 United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),9 and the
Geneva Conventions forbidding sexual violence as a
tool or result of conflict.10 Despite this progress, how-
ever, there have been few international prosecutions for
sexual violence against women.11
Sexual abuse against women, such as rape, sex-
ual slavery, and mutilation, is often used during armed
conflict both as a tool to humiliate and eradicate the op-
ponent and to demonstrate heightened feelings of power 
and control.12 Although sexual violence may be re-
garded as an inherent characteristic of war, the ICC
holds individuals culpable for these gendered crimes.13
At the ICC, rape is defined as:
The perpetrator invaded the body of a
person by conduct resulting in penetra-
tion, however slight, of any part of the
body of the victim . . . (2) The invasion
was committed by force, or by threat of 
force or coercion, such as that caused by 
fear of violence, duress, detention, psy-
chological oppression or
abuse of power, against such
person or another person...14
This definition can also be found
as a crime against humanity (art.
7(1)(g)-1) if the conduct was part of
a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population and the
perpetrator knew the conduct was
part of the widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian popula-
tion.15 Additionally, sexual slavery
and rape can be considered a war
crime if it was “committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”16 While
it is true that the ICC is currently investigating sexual
abuses,17 the ICC’s commitment to rigorously investi-
gating, prosecuting, and convicting sexual violence of-
fenders is questionable. This Editorial will first
discuss ICC cases, in which the Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) or Pre-Trial Chamber failed to bring or dropped
charges of sexual violence crimes against women.
Then, it provides the rationales proffered by ICC pros-
ecutors and judges for their failure to pursue these vio-
lent crimes, as well as critiques of those rationales by
international human rights organizations.  Finally, it
compares the ICC’s passive approach to crimes of sex-
ual violence to the aggressive nature of anti-sexual vio-
lence criminal laws in the United States.  This Editorial
will conclude that the ICC should continue the recent
trend of increasing the investigation and prosecution of
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crimes of sexual violence as in the U.S.
Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) failed to rigorously
prosecute war criminals who committed sexual violence
in connection to the armed conflicts.18 The purpose of
the ICTY and ICTR was to promptly prosecute the worst
of the war criminals for the most serious crimes.19 How-
ever, Amnesty International reported that “[d]espite ex-
tensive documentation by women’s groups,
non-governmental organizations and NATO of rape and
other crimes of sexual violence committed on a large
scale during the conflict in Kosovo . . . it appears that
there had, up to April 2007[,] been only one indictment
including a charge of rape or sexual violence as a war
crime or crime against humanity.”20 Explaining why
there were few indictments for sexual violence against
women, judges at the ICTY specifically cited lack of
time and resources to effectively investigate, prosecute,
and convict state and non-state actors under the criminal
liability doctrine of command responsibility.21 Rather
than prosecuting the cases themselves, the ICTY and
ICTR left cases of sexual violence and other sensitive
cases for domestic courts.22
The ICC increased investigation and prosecution
of sexual violence crimes, largely in response to the fail-
ure of international criminal law, in general, to effec-
tively confront sexual violence as part of armed conflict,
and more specifically in response to the failure of the
ICTY and ICTR to prosecute the crimes.23 The ICC thus
far has investigated violations of international criminal
law arising in countries facing conflict or post-conflict
difficulties, such as the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR),
Uganda, and Darfur, Sudan.24
Despite documented widespread sexual violence
against women occurring in armed conflicts around the
world, the ICC has only sought a limited number of sex-
ual slavery and rape charges.  So far, the ICC has in-
dicted thirteen men for a variety of crimes.25 In the
DRC, the ICC has charged four men, including
Lubanga, for international criminal violations.26 The
OTP, however, failed to bring charges against Lubanga
for sexual slavery or rape.27 Two other leaders, Germain
Katanga, the alleged commander of the Force de Résis-
tance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI), and Mathieu Ngudjolo
Chui, the alleged former leader of the Front des Nation-
alistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI),28 were originally
charged with sexual violence crimes, including sexual
slavery and rape both as a war crimes and crimes against
humanity.29 Fearing for the safety of the witnesses of
the crimes, the OTP thought it necessary to drop the sex-
ual violence charges against the two leaders.30 However,
once the witnesses to the sexual slavery and rape were
placed in the ICC witness protection program, the OTP
re-introduced the sexual violence charges.31
The ICC has included sexual violence crimes as
part of the indictment against several criminals from the
CAR, Uganda, and Darfur.32 The OTP has charged three
men from the Darfur conflict with rape and sexual slav-
ery, including the head of state of Sudan, Omar al
Bashir.33 Additionally, the ICC brought sexual slavery
and rape charges against Joseph Kony for crimes com-
mitted in Uganda.34 Finally, the OTP brought charges
of rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity
against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo in connection to the
crimes committed in the Central African Republic.35
These men, however, remain at large, and their cases are
pending.36
Prosecutors at the ICC argue that factors, such
as lack of time, resources, and evidence, account for few
charges brought against few individuals.37 According
to the OTP, the ICC dropped charges of sexual violence
in 2008 against Ngudjolo and Katanga due to a lack of
evidence and time to investigate these crimes.38 Even
though the ICC dropped the charges, prosecutors and in-
vestigators maintained that the OTP felt it important to
investigate sexual violence charges against both
Katanga and Ngudjolo, and gathered evidence from the
field demonstrating that sexual slavery and rape took
place during at least one specific attack in 2003.39 The
OTP claims that even more sexual violence charges, in-
cluding forced marriage and sexual mutilation, may be
brought against offenders still at large.40
In the cases of Katanga and Ngudjolo, the Pre-
Trial Chamber concluded that witnesses to and victims
of the sexual crimes lacked protection, and accordingly
the OTP placed the victims and witnesses in the ICC
Witness Protection Program (ICCPP).41 Despite the ar-
rAtionAle For FAilure to Aggressively Pursue
sexuAl violenCe ChArges And Critiques by
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gument that this protection would effectively allow wit-
nesses to testify, one judge still disagreed with the rein-
statement of charges for sexual slavery against Katanga
and Ngudjolo.42 The judge argued that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support the reinstatement of charges
because there were no “substantial grounds to believe”
that Katanga and Ngudjolo intended to sexually enslave
or rape the victims or that they knew or should have
known about the crimes.43 Instead, the judge asserted
that the evidence suggested that
the defendants punished those
who committed the crimes.44
Still, the OTP reinstated charges
of sexual slavery and rape over
the judge’s objection due to the
placement of the victims and
witnesses into the ICC victims
and Witnesses Unit of the Reg-
istry (vWU), the ICCPP.45
Even though the ICC
has been more aggressive than
the ICTY and ICTR in prose-
cuting sexual violence crimes,
the ICC has similarly limited
investigations and prosecutions of sexual violence
crimes.46 At the ICC, the elements of rape are difficult
to prove without witness testimony,47 and the social
stigma of rape prevents many witnesses from coming
forward, leading to few convictions.48 Further, to expe-
dite cases, the OTP brings fewer charges for faster con-
victions.49 Procedural rules refer the OTP investigation
findings to the Pre-Trial Chamber so that the judges may
determine whether there is enough evidence to support
a conviction against a defendant at trial.50 In the case
of Lubanga, the Prosecutor’s decision to expedite the
case by limiting the number of charges ultimately de-
feated any sexual violence charge .51 The Prosecutor
contended there was insufficient evidence to show that
Lubanga held command responsibility for the rapes and
acts of sexual slavery, and therefore decided not to pro-
ceed with charges of sexual violence.52
The ICC claims that it continues to investigate
sexual violence crimes against other offenders from the
CAR, Uganda, and Darfur.53 In fact, the OTP contends
that the ICC is making great strides in the adjudicating
sexual violence in these states by bringing more charges
against the alleged criminals and especially against the
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for rape.54 In CAR,
many more will face charges for sexual violence, such
as the former vice-President of the DRC, Jean-Pierre
Bemba, who faces charges of rape and torture as a crime
against humanity and war crime.55
In response to the ICC’s explanations for their
failure to vigorously pursue sexual violence charges,
human rights organizations argue that complicity is con-
doning the practice.56 These critics question why the
ICC did not include sexual violence charges against
Lubanga of the DRC, where girls were kidnapped,
forced into Lubanga’s militia, and endured numerous
rapes and prolonged sexual slav-
ery.57 Further, the ICC failed to
charge Lubanga with rape and
sexual slavery in the face of
ample evidence of such crimes.58
Both Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch reported
that ICC investigators found
widespread cases of rape against
women as young as eleven years
old committed under Lubanga’s
authority, while other women
were captured and held as sexual
slaves for militiamen.59 Al-
though investigators managed to
put together witness testimony, many victims of sexual
violence were killed after their attacks, eliminating any
possibility that the women could testify.60
The evidence illustrates that Lubanga’s troops
committed crimes against humanity.  It was a wide-
spread attack against the female civilian population.61
The abuses could also be tried as a war crime because
they were gendered crimes and committed as part of a
policy or large-scale commission in the context of an in-
ternational armed conflict, and Lubanga was aware of
the crimes.62
Despite the systematic sexual violence against
civilian women and over 12,500 female child soldiers
forced into the militia, the OTP dropped charges of sex-
ual violence, including sexual slavery as a war crime
and crime against humanity, against Katanga and Ngud-
jolo “after a Pre-Trial Chamber judge excluded the state-
ments of witnesses supporting those charges on the
grounds that the witnesses were not adequately pro-
tected.”63 Subsequently, the OTP managed to reinstate
the charges after witnesses were put into the ICC Wit-
ness Protection Program.64
One problematic inequity in international crim-
inal law, according to human rights organizations, is that
female child soldiers lose out on crimes against human-
ity protections because, although they are often victims
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of widespread or systematic sexual slavery and rape, fe-
male child soldiers are not victims of crimes committed
against a “civilian” population.65 Although the crimi-
nals who enslave female child soldiers could be tried for
sexual violence as a war crime, the Rome Statute does
not criminalize the “use of children indirectly in armed
conflicts, which disproportionately affects girls typically
used in these ways.”66
Critics argue that the United Nations Security
Council, when establishing the ICC, acknowledged sex-
ual enslavement and rape as inherent to “military oper-
ations,” and, therefore, the U.N. provides impunity to
offenders.67 ICC critics also argue that by failing to
charge offenders with sexual violence, the ICC is acqui-
escing to the belief that sexual violence is a natural re-
sult of armed conflict.68 They contend that international
human rights, humanitarian, and criminal law provisions
are “inadequate and, moreover, that the law of armed
conflict incorporates a gendered hierarchy in the sense
that the rules dealing with women are regarded as less
important than others and their infringement is not taken
as seriously.”69 These critics suggest that a Women’s
Convention on the law of armed conflict is necessary to
illustrate the severity of these crimes and that the con-
vention would demonstrate that the ICC could effec-
tively prosecute sexual violence offenders.70
Critics also argue that international criminal law
has been developed with an androcentric bias.71 Specif-
ically, the ICC’s Rome Statute illustrates a “prosecuto-
rial strategy of selective justice and efficient
procedure.”72 Society has developed international law
that reflects the male experiences without considering
the needs of or violence against women.73
Furthermore, critics argue, that domestic crimi-
nal law regimes are ineffective in prosecuting sexual vi-
olence.  For example, women from the DRC live in a
state without effective rule of law mechanisms, and gen-
der-bias in the judicial process is prevalent.74 Although
ICC prosecutors recognize the difficulty in gathering
witness statements in these situations, it is more difficult
for victims to testify in national courts when they are
forced to confront their attackers in a public forum and
when domestic law enforcement officers discourage
bringing claims of sexual violence.75 Instead, the ICC
should take the reins in adjudicating these sensitive
cases, while protecting victims in the Witness Protection
Program.76 Because domestic courts will likely fail to
pursue sexual violence claims, the ICC’s should con-
tinue its recent increased vigor in bringing sexual vio-
lence charges and add sexual violence charges in
pending cases, such as the Lubanga case.
The United States refuses to consent to ICC ju-
risdiction, yet it continues to advocate for the adjudica-
tion of human rights abuses in national and international
courts.77 The U.S. failure to consent to ICC jurisdiction
does not illustrate its complicity with sexual violence
crimes, but rather its fear of ICC encroachment on
American sovereignty.78 However, international organ-
izations, such as Amnesty International, continue to
question the U.S. commitment to promoting peace and
preventing conflict and wonder if, without U.S. support,
the United Nations and ICC can effectively hold indi-
viduals accountable for international crimes.79
Still, U.S. rape and sexual violence laws illus-
trate an aggressive posture towards the prosecution of
sexual violence criminals.80 Since the feminist advo-
cacy of the 1960s, law reforms shifted the way U.S.
courts frame and adjudicate rape and domestic violence
cases.81 Much of this advocacy focused on changing the
historic perception of the passive female who is blamed
for the violent acts of others.82 Sexual violence, discrim-
ination, and rape laws changed because feminist advo-
cates were able to debunk theories that male power
inherently dominates women.83
U.S. sexual violence laws reformed through the
“creation of specific domestic violence offenses,” fed-
eral prosecution of offenders involving interstate activ-
ity, and the acknowledgment of self-defense for victims
of sexual violence.84 These reforms also targeted the so-
cial stigma against sexual violence victims by providing
shelters for psychological and medical recovery.85 In
addition to the criminalization of sexual violence
crimes, U.S. statutes reformed anti-discrimination and
tort laws to provide women with civil remedies.86 U.S.
laws further protect victims by attempting to prevent vi-
olence before it occurs, exemplified by sexual harass-
ment statutes.87
Although they do not in a state of armed conflict,
sexual sadist cases may be factually similar to those that
arise in conflict zones.  Sexual sadists utilize elements
of both torture and sexual violence, often resulting in
while the united stAtes hAs FAiled to exert
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the rape, sexual enslavement, and death of the victim.88
For instance, in State v. Smith,89 the defendant, a diag-
nosed sexual sadist, raped, tortured, and murdered two
victims.90 The defendant was sentenced to death.91 Sim-
ilarly, in People v. Guerra,92 the defendant was not clin-
ically diagnosed with sexual sadism, but he nonetheless
received the death penalty for the attempted rape and
the murder of a woman.93 A significant number of other
cases, including State v. Ross94 and People v. Lindsay,95
resulted in the death penalty and other severe sentences
for the perpetrators of sexual violence.  As demonstrated
by these cases, the laws, courts, and public act in concert
to harshly condemn perpetrators of sexual violence
crimes.
Although the ICC was intended to respond to the
failures of past internationalized courts, it still has a long
way to go before it can be said that it has aggressively
pursued crimes of sexual violence.  The ICC’s commit-
ment to vigorously pursuing charges of sexual violence
is questionable, as evidenced by the lack of, limited, or
dropped charges of sexual violence crimes against per-
petrators like Lubanga.  Critics contend that refusing to
investigate and prosecute sensitive cases involving rape
and sexual enslavement has led to impunity for the of-
fenders.  The ICC has responded to these criticisms by
reinstating sexual violence charges against Katanga and
Ngudjolo as well as by bringing charges of rape and sex-
ual slavery against others indicted at the ICC.  The re-
form of sexual violence laws in the United States
exemplifies an effective aggressive stance towards sex-
ual violence, and the ICC should adopt this rigorous ap-
proach.  Rigorous prosecution and conviction is
important because “[i]nternational criminal prosecution
works to end impunity for gender-based crimes, height-
ens the profile of gender-motivated violence in the in-
ternational community, challenges gender relations and
hierarchies that perpetuate discriminatory practices, and
sets important precedents for future cases tried at the in-
ternational level.”96
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